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5.4 HORIZONTAL GENDER SEGREGATION IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION – STEM APPLICATIONS
Koen Declercq & Júlia Varga
Despite the significant increase in the participation of women in higher edu-
cation as presented in chapter 5.1, horizontal gender segregation is still con-
siderable. STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) study 
fields are chosen by a much smaller proportion of women than men. This not 
only negatively influences labour market opportunities of women, but also 
the labour supply of STEM graduates.
The reasons for horizontal gender segregation have been broadly studied in 
the literature. One strand of the literature tried to explain this phenomenon 
by the gender skill gaps in test scores in mathematics (Ceci et al. 2009, Ceci–
Williams, 2010, Halpern et al. 2007, Hyde et al. 2008, Turner–Bowen, 1999, 
Wai et al. 2010). However, most of this research concluded that the gender 
gap in test scores in mathematics has significantly decreased over recent dec-
ades and therefore, nowadays gender performance gaps explain the horizon-
tal gender segregation only to a smaller extent (Hyde et al. 2008, Spelke, 2005, 
Goldin et al. 2006).
Other research found that labour market expectations of men and women 
differ from each other and can partly explain the different decisions in higher 
education (see for example Montmarquette et al. 2002, Varga, 2006, Boudar-
bat, 2008, Arcidiacono et al. 2012). These studies found that women are less 
responsive to expected earnings when making their choices in higher educa-
tion. This is another reason why women are less likely to choose the STEM-
fields than men. According to Zafar (2013), future wage expectations explain 
only a small part of the gender gap in STEM fields. Gender differences in 
preferences are the most important explanation. Other studies arrived at the 
same conclusion (Turner–Bowen, 1999, Kahn–Ginter, 2017). More recent 
studies show that horizontal segregation in higher education – in addition 
to the differences in preferences – also has its roots in gender differences in 
risk aversion (Bertrand, 2011, Croson–Gneezy, 2009, Eckel–Grossman, 2008, 
Gneezy et al. 2003) and in the propensity to participate in competitions as 
well as in self-confidence (Reuben et al. 2014). These studies found that wom-
en are more risk-averse and are less self-confident. This could also explain the 
choices of different fields of study as women are less likely to apply to highly 
competitive fields.
In connection with the explanations based on the differences in preferences, 
the question occurs whether preferences are constant or if they change over 
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time. This chapter studies whether a change in admission chances influences 
application decisions to STEM programmes and whether the effects differ by 
gender. The analysis is based on the impact evaluation of the education reform 
of 2012.1 In 2012 a sudden and considerable reduction took place both in the 
number of public-financed university places and in university places in general. 
The study fields were not equally affected by this decrease. The reform implied 
a proportionally larger decrease in the number of non-STEM places, which led 
to an increase in the relative admission chances to the public-financed STEM 
programmes. The impact of this modification is analysed below.
The analysis is based on two administrative databases which are linked 
at individual level, namely the 2011 and 2012 waves of the whole sample 
of the Secondary School Graduation Database of the Educational Agency 
and the whole sample of the Higher Education Application Database of the 
Higher Education Application Agency. The linked data observe which sec-
ondary school graduates applied for higher education studies in the given 
year. The data also observe the graduation results of all graduates, the type 
of their secondary school, the type of the settlement where it is located 
and the date of birth of the graduate. The data was only used for the stu-
dents who graduated in the year of the higher education application i.e. in 
2011 or in 2012. The analysis does not consider individuals who applied 
to state-accredited higher vocational education. The sample was limited to 
students who applied for an initial (BA) or a so-called an undivided pro-
gram. The higher education application database contains information on 
all applications including the applicant’s number, institution, programme, 
the type of the financing, the level of the training type and, if the applicant 
was admitted to the given training programme. Furthermore, the data also 
include detailed information on the applicant’s ‘test scores’ (achievements 
in the secondary school and the results of the secondary school graduation 
exam), additional scores for disadvantaged applicants or applicants who 
had taken a language exam before.
Table 5.4.1 presents the applications of 2011 and 2012, before and after the 
policy reform. According to the descriptive statistics, it seems that women re-
acted more strongly to the changes. The share of higher education applicants 
decreased for both men and women, but the decrease was more outspoken for 
women. In 2011, one-fourth of the male graduates applied to a STEM pro-
gramme as the first selected option while this proportion was only 7.1 percent 
among women. STEM applicants of both genders chose almost exclusively 
public-financed training programmes. In 2012 the proportion of men apply-
ing to STEM training programmes as a first option did not change while the 
proportion of women increased by 1 percent. The share of men who applied 
for STEM training programmes as a final option decreased by 0.6 percent 
while the proportion of women increased by 0.5 percent.
1 Detailed analysis see at CERS 
HAS.
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Table 5.4.1: Application decision in higher education ranking. The share of higher 
education applicants compared to the total number of secondary school graduates 
in the given year by gender, 2011–2012
Men Women
Public- 
financed
Self- 
financed Total
Public- 
financed
Self- 
financed Total
A) First ranked option, 2011
STEM 25.1 0.1 25.2 7.1 0.0 7.1
Non-STEM 27.6 1.6 29.2 52.8 1.9 54.7
Total 52.7 1.7 54.4 60.0 1.9 61.8
B) Last ranked option, 2012
STEM 24.8 0.4 25.2 8.1 0.1 8.2
Non-STEM 18.3 6.3 24.6 36.5 10.1 46.6
Total 43.1 6.7 49.8 44.6 10.2 54.8
C) First ranked option, 2011
STEM 23.9 2.8 26.8 8.6 0.7 9.2
Non-STEM 19.3 8.4 27.7 40.3 12.3 52.6
Total 43.2 11.2 54.4 48.9 13.0 61.8
D) Last ranked option, 2012
STEM 19.1 7.2 26,2 7.7 2.0 9.7
Non-STEM 11.0 12.5 23,6 24.2 20.9 45.1
Total 30.1 19.7 49,8 31.9 22.9 54.8
Table 5.4.2 presents the results of the simple models that evaluate how the 
reform affected application decisions: (1) the decision to apply to higher edu-
cation, (2) the number of applications, (3) the decision to rank a STEM pro-
gramme first, (4) the decision to rank a STEM programme last, (5) the deci-
sion to rank at least one STEM programme, (6) the total number of STEM 
programs, (7) the decision to rank a self-financed programme first, (8) the 
decision to rank a self-funded program last, (9) the decision to rank at least 
one self-financed study programme and (10) the total number of self-financed 
options ranked. Models (2) and (6) are simple OLS regressions and the fur-
ther ones are logit models.2
The results of model (1) show that women are more likely to apply to higher 
education. The reforms of 2012 caused a decrease in the number of students ap-
plying to higher education and especially discouraged participation of women.
The following regressions show that after the reform, more men applied to 
STEM programmes both as their first and final selections and that men sub-
mitted a higher number of such applications than women. However, there was 
no significant difference between men and women regarding the change in 
the probability of applying to at least one STEM programme. Men responded 
to the modifications of 2012 rather by increasing their STEM applications 
while women were more likely to apply to self-financed programmes after 
2012 which – as the admission chances to the self-financed programmes are 
higher – seems to be a less risky strategy.3
2 The table only contains es-
timation results of the gender 
variable, the dummy variable of 
the year of the reform (i.e. 2012) 
and the interaction of these the 
two variables.
3 The student considers if it is 
reasonable to invest time in the 
preparation for the admission 
exam. An important element of 
this consideration is the prob-
ability of admission. The lower 
the probability for the admis-
sion the riskier is the time in-
vested into the preparation.
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Table 5.4.2: Higher education applications – the impact of the reform
(1) Applies (2) Number of total applications (3) STEM raked first (4) STEM ranked last
Women
0.080* 0.096* –0.299* –0.305*
(0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005)
D2012
–0.047* 0.272* 0.018* 0.016*
(0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
Women × D2012
–0.049* –0.111* –0.005 –0.005
(0.006) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006)
(5) At least one STEM 
application
(6) STEM applications 
in total
(7) Application to 
self-financed  
programme as  
first selection
(8) Application to 
self-financed  
programme as  
final selection
Women
–0.339* –0.912* 0.003 0.012*
(0.005) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005)
D2012
0.014* 0.302* 0.105* 0.200*
(0.005) (0.017) (0.003) (0.005)
Women × D2012
0.004 –0.239* 0.026* 0.017*
(0.007) (0.020) (0.004) (0.006)
(9) Applies for at 
least one self-fi-
nanced programme
(10) Number of ap-
plications for self-
financed programmes
Women
0.022* 0.049
(0.005) (0.010)
D2012
0.245* 0.660*
(0.005) (0.013)
Women × D2012
0.028* 0.114*
(0.007) (0.017)
Note: The decision to apply to higher education was estimated on the whole sample 
of secondary school graduates in 2011 and 2012. Control variables are age, results 
of the secondary school graduation exam, and regional fixed effects. The other 
models were estimated on the subsample of secondary school graduates who ap-
plied for higher education. The control variables in these estimations – in addition 
to the former ones – were an indicator for low socio-economic status and the type 
of the secondary school of the applicant.
* Significant at 5 percent.
A structural model was estimated to measure the extent to which secondary 
school graduates consider admission probabilities when making their appli-
cation decisions. The model allows for gender differences in preferences for 
the different fields of study and gender differences in responsiveness to ex-
pected admission probabilities. (For the description of the model see Annex 
5.4). The estimation process consisted of two steps. First, based on the data 
of 2011, the probability of admission to the first ranked programme was esti-
mated with a binary logit regression. Next, the probability that a high school 
graduate chooses a particular study program at a specific institution was esti-
mated with a conditional logit model.4 Table 5.4.3 presents the results of the 
conditional logit model and shows significant gender differences in the choice 
4 The estimation results on the 
first step are not published here, 
for the results see at CERS HAS. 
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between the several study fields. First, women are less likely to apply for tech-
nology and ICT than men, but there is no gender difference in the choice for 
natural science programmes. This means that it is not the case in all STEM 
fields that women are less likely to choose them. Next, the estimation results 
show that women are more responsive to admission probabilities when mak-
ing their choices in higher education. This can be related to the findings of 
previous studies that women are more risk-averse in their choices than men.
Table 5.4.3: Application decisions of first ranked options
Evonomics, 
Business
Technology, 
ICT
Teacher  
training Health
Natural  
Science Agricultural
Constant
–7.442* –8.591* –5.124* –8.329* –7.925* –7.220*
(0.085) (0.099) (0.129) (0.141) (0.173) (0.148)
Male
–0.719* 1.593* –2.707* –1.185* 0.227* 0.149*
(0.043) (0.058) (0.140) (0.068) (0.084) (0.072)
+19 years
0.076 –0.209* –0.101 –0.356* –0.482* –0.083
(0.041) (0.045) (0.073) (0.065) (0.085) (0.074)
Mathematics
4.123* 5.413* 0.503* 3.270* 3.545* 2.267*
(0.111) (0.126) (0.199) (0.152) (0.192) (0.186)
Hungarian 
language
2.181* 1.224* 1.444* 2.921* 1.330* 1.338*
(0.137) (0.139) (0.241) (0.215) (0.246) (0.238)
History
1.718* 0.570* 0.913* 2.663* 2.120* 2.028*
(0.150) (0.154) (0.256) (0.229) (0.281) (0.263)
Budapest
–0.805* –1.080* –0.689* –0.613* –0.841* –1.152*
(0.044) (0.047) (0.081) (0.067) (0.084) (0.082)
Self
–0.838* –3.074* –2.881* –2.007* –4.026* –2.370*
(0.172) (0.257) (0.300) (0.303) (1.013) (0.281)
Legal, admin-
istrative Arts
Humanities and 
Social Sciences
Self-financed 
programme
Probability of 
admission
Distance from 
the institution
Constant
–7.283* –6.426* –7.551* – 1.756* –0.015*
(0.125) (0.108) (0.092) (0.065) (0.000)
Male
0.057 –0.121* –0.853* 0.519* –0.673* 0.000
(0.055) (0.056) (0.046) (0.098) (0.085) (0.000)
+19 years
–0.084 –0.121* 0.077* 0.179* – –
(0.058) (0.057) (0.043) (0.085)
Mathematics
1.000* 1.055* 0.453* –1.708* – –
(0.146) (0.151) (0.148) (0.239)
Hungarian 
language
5.053* 2.229* 4.553* –2.967* – –
(0.200) (0.182) (0.148) (0.276)
History
1.371* 1.408* 1.922* –1.456* – –
(0.208) (0.197) (0.156) (0.301)
Budapest
–1.279* –0.304* –0.572* 0.968* – –
(0.062) (0.056) (0.046) (0.082)
Self
–0.148 –2.530* –1.277* –
(0.185) (0.222) (0.182)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05. The probability of ranking 
an option first is estimated with a conditional logit model. The model is estimated 
on the sample of all high school graduates of 2011. Results must be interpreted rela-
tive to the base category of not applying to higher education.
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Finally, we used the model to study the possible impact of an alternative ad-
mission policy in higher education. We simulated an open access policy in 
STEM programmes. This hypothetical policy allows all high school gradu-
ates, irrespective of high school background, to start at all STEM options in 
higher education. This hypothetical policy stimulates enrolment in STEM 
programs without discouraging students to apply to other programs. Table 
5.4.4 compares the outcomes of this simulation with the status quo of 2011.
Table 5.4.4: The simulated impact of the alternative higher education policy. 
Counterfactual analysis: the impact of open access to STEM programs
Status quo in 2011 Counterfactual policy
state-financed self-financed total state-financed self-financed total
Men
STEM 25.1 0.1 25.2 37.4 0.0 37.4
Non-STEM 27.6 1.6 29.2 23.0 1.3 24.2
Total 52.7 1.7 54.4 60.3 1.3 61.6
Women
STEM 7.1 0.0 7.1 16.6 0.0 16.6
Non-STEM 52.9 1.9 54.7 47.4 1.7 49.0
Total 60.0 1.9 61.9 64.0 1.7 65.7
Note: Predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2011 high school graduates. 
Outcomes of the counterfactual policy are expressed as percentage point changes 
relative to the status quo.
Under the counterfactual scenario of an open access policy in subsidized 
STEM programs, more men and women would apply to higher education. 
More men and women would apply to STEM programs and fewer high school 
graduates would apply to non-STEM programs. While the relative increase in 
applications to STEM programs is larger for women, the increase in the total 
number of students applying to STEM programs is larger for men.
Our analysis shows that changes in admission standards can encourage stu-
dents to apply to STEM programmes. At the same time, we show that sec-
ondary school graduates do not perceive all higher education programmes as 
close substitutes. A certain proportion of students – and especially women – 
even desist from applying to higher education if the chance of admission and 
therefore the utility of applying decreases for their preferred programmes. The 
analysis also revealed that men and women not only differ in their preferenc-
es for STEM fields, but women are also more responsive to admission prob-
abilities when making their application decisions. The results also showed 
that there are no gender differences in the probability of applying to certain 
fields within STEM – namely natural sciences – if we control for the results 
in mathematics and other characteristics of our model. However, in order to 
identify the reasons for the considerable gender difference in the technologi-
cal and IT fields further research is needed.
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5.4 Annex
A student i applies to a study program j ε J at an institution k ε K to maximize the 
utility of studying. The utility of applying to a specific study option is given by
Uijk (Xi,λijk,dik) = α
j+α jXi+α λijk+α λijkXi+α dik+α dikXi+εijk
Uijk (Xi,λijk,dik) = Vijk (Xi,λijk,dik)+εijk ,
0 1 2 53 4
with Vijk (Xi ,λijk ,dik) the deterministic part of utility. Utility depends on an 
alternative specific constant α j0 , and personal characteristics such as gender and 
high school background Xi . Utility also depends on the admission probability 
λijk . Students obtain a higher utility from programs for which they have a high-
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er probability of being admitted. We interact this probability with gender to 
assess whether women are more responsive to admission probabilities when 
making their application decisions. Admission probabilities differ between 
programs but also between institutions. Given that students must pay a fee 
for each study program they rank after their third option, students might stra-
tegically apply to a less popular institution for which they have higher admis-
sion probabilities. Previous literature shows that travel distance is an impor-
tant factor of participation in higher education and the decisions where and 
what to study. Students prefer study options located in their neighborhood. 
We therefore include the travel distance dik between the location of the high 
school of the student and the institution as a determinant of utility. Finally, 
utility depends on an unobserved preference shock εijk , which is iid type 1 
extreme value distributed. The probability that student i chooses for study 
program j at institution k is then given by the logit formula
exp Vijk (Xi,λijk,dik)
Σj'εj,k'εk exp (Vijk' (Xi,λijk' ,dik)) 
Pijk = .
' ' '
In the model, students consider the probability of being admitted when ap-
plying to higher education. The probability that student  is admitted to study 
program  at institution  is given by
λijk (Mi ,capjk) = β
j+ βj Mi+β capjk+ ηijk ,0 1 2
and depends on a program alternative specific constant β j0 , a vector of ma-
triculation exam scores Mi , and a measure of the capacity of program j at in-
stitution k: capjk . Capacity of the program is defined as the ratio of admitted 
students relative to the total applicants in the study option. The capacity of 
the program serves as an exclusion restriction. Capacity influences the utility 
of applying to an option only indirectly through the effect on the admission 
probability. We assume that there is no direct effect of capacity on the utility 
of applying to specific options. Finally, the admission probability depends on 
an iid type 1 extreme value distributed error term ηijk .
